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Abstract 
In  this  paper  we  evaluate  the  wage  gap  due  to  differences  in  rewards  to  characteristics  by 
studying the entire distribution of the individual unexplained wage gap. We use quantile regressions 
and an adaptation of the procedure suggested by Machado and Mata (2005) to derive the marginal 
distributions  of  predicted  and  counterfactual  female  wages.  Then,  we  estimate  probability 
distributions of unexplained wage gap conditional to observed characteristics. The methodology 
allows to evaluate the probability of women with different characteristics to experience any level of 
discrimination.  The  main  focus  of  the  paper  is  on  the  relationship  between  human  capital 
characteristics and outcomes in differences in pay. In particular, we focus our attention on different 
educational levels. Under the hypothesis that women invest in education to signal their productivity, 
we should detect a lower wage gap −due to differences in rewards to characteristics− among high 
educated females. Our analysis suggests that education can be a good signal but not for all females. 
We also show that education interacts differently with other human capital characteristics, such as 
general experience acquired in the labour market. The analysis is carried out on Italian data drawn 
from the last available cross-section of the European Community Household Panel (2001) 
 
JEL classification: J31, C14 
Keywords: Gender wage gap, distributive analysis, human capital.  3 
1. Introduction 
Despite the attempt of institutions and international organizations to raise the awareness on the 
relevance of gender wage differentials, research on the gender pay gap in Italy has been relatively 
scant, although increasing in recent years especially because of a surge in interest in comparative 
studies  among  European  countries  (Arulampalam  et  al.  2005,  Beblo  et  al.  2003b,  Olivetti  and 
Petrongolo 2005). In particular, some effort at the national level has been made in the last few years 
through the contributions of Addabbo and Favaro (2007), Favaro and Magrini (in press), Comitato 
Nazionale Parità e Pari Opportunità (2001), Rustichelli (2005) and Villa (2005). 
The  international  literature  on  the  topic  has  been  paying  special  attention  on  discussing  the 
methodological aspects of the analysis, suggesting new analytical schemes, often complementary, 
that enrich the set of methodological instruments for measuring the incidence of wage differentials 
and  provide  alternative  ways  and  more  sophisticated  tools  than  the  traditional  methodology 
suggested by Oaxaca and Blinder (1973).  
The main contribution of the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder approach can be summarised with the 
idea that the raw wage gap can be decomposed into two terms: a first term representing productivity 
differences explained by individual characteristics and a second term explaining earnings gaps in 
terms of differences in the remuneration of the characteristics; this second term is then usually 
interpreted as the discriminatory component of the wage gap. On the other hand, the decomposition 
relies on the preliminary evaluation of the rewards to individual characteristics, which is carried out 
by  applying  OLS  estimates  to  gender-separate  ‘earnings  functions’;  consequently,  the  two 
components of the raw wage gap are calculated in average terms.  
This methodology dominated the empirical literature on wage differentials throughout the 1980s 
and the 1990s and is still largely applied by political and scientific institutions to evaluate the two 
components of the pay gap. The European Commission (2002) estimates an average gap between   4 
female and male gross hourly earnings in the European area of 16.2 percentage points
1, of which 
less than 3% appears to be caused by average differences in characteristics while more than 13% is 
attributed to differences in remuneration. When disaggregating data by country, a more composite 
picture comes forward where United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Germany and 
Spain account for the highest raw gaps; on the contrary, Greece, France, Denmark, Italy, Belgium 
and Portugal experience the lowest gender wage gaps. In addition to this, the study shows that the 
share of gender pay gaps due to differences in the characteristics’ remuneration varies significantly 
among countries. Italy performs rather well, having one of the lowest wage gap in the area (around 
9%); however, the differential is almost totally explained by differences in the remuneration of the 
characteristics. 
Inter-country analyses that make use of comparable data, however, depict a gender pay gap in 
Italy which appears to be more optimistic than that emerging from national sources. On the other 
hand, Italy lacks good national sources of data on earnings and worked hours and most of the 
research has to rely on approximations of hourly wages or on monthly/yearly earnings, probably 
implying an overevaluation of the gap. Flabbi (2001), using the Bank of Italy dataset, estimates a 
monthly  earning  gap  equal,  on  average,  to  19%,  5%  of  which  is  attributed  to  differences  in 
characteristics and 13.7% to differences in the rewards. More recently, Rustichelli (2005) evaluates 
a gender gap between female and male daily wages of, on average, 39 percentage points, whereby 
differences in the rewards are responsible for most of the gap (precisely, 26.9 points). 
The Oaxaca-Blinder’s approach is recognised as a fundamental contribution to the research on 
gender  differences  in  payment;  nevertheless,  as  recalled  at  the  outset,  a  number  of  recent 
contributions  have  introduced  important  methodological  improvements  to  the  traditional 
framework. In primis, it has to be mentioned the development set up by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 
(1991), who decompose the wage gap by taking into account also differences in non-observable 
characteristics.  
                             
1 Estimates based on data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), wave 5 (year 1998).   5 
A more recent advancement is owed to Machado and Mata (2005), according to which female 
marginal  distributions  of  theoretical  and  counterfactual  wages  are  derived  using  coefficients 
estimated at different points of male and female distributions, using quantile regression analysis 
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Buchinsky, 1998).  
All these papers, however, still suffer from an important drawback: the analysis is based on the 
comparison, quantile by quantile, between the distribution of estimated wages and the distribution 
of counterfactual wages. As a result, these methodologies are unable to shed light on the individual 
dimension  of  the  wage  gap  due  to  characteristics  and  may  produce  misleading  results  as  the 
differences between the two distributions do not depend exclusively on discrimination suffered by 
individuals but also on the mobility across quantiles introduced when generating the counterfactual 
wage distribution. In other words, these recent methodologies are not actually able to analyse the 
extent of the gap at different points of wage distribution.  
In  this  paper  we  study  wage  differentials  between  male  and  female  workers  in  Italy  by 
employing a method recently developed (Favaro and Magrini, in press), which allows to exactly 
evaluate the extension of the gap, due to rewards, experienced by each female worker. The method 
consists in measuring the incidence of the differential at the individual level, i.e., female by female, 
and then in estimating the conditional bivariate density functions defined on the individual levels of 
the gap and the corresponding individual characteristics. In this way, it is possible to identify which 
categories of female workers are affected by low rewards the most and to assign a probability of 
occurrence to any interval of “unexplained” wage gap, also conditional on any characteristic or 
factor of interest. The method, while providing a contribution to the evaluation of the individual 
incidence  of  the  wage  gap  and  its  components,  still  relies  on  estimating  first  gender-specific 
predicted and counterfactual wages. Differently from Favaro and Magrini (forthcoming), in this 
article we depart from the OLS estimation procedure and employ the quantile regression analysis 
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Buchinsky, 1998) and a simplified version of Machado and  Mata 
(2005) to derive marginal distributions from estimated values.    6 
Based on the literature showing that investing in education is a signal of productivity, we explore 
the Italian component of the wage gap due to differences in rewards to characteristics conditional 
on different educational levels, expecting a lower component along the wage distribution of most 
educated females. Actually, our study will show that, although the “unexplained” part of the wage 
gap is proportionally lower among highly than lowly educated women, its extent tends to broaden at 
the highest wage levels. Conversely, among lowly educated women the probability to experience 
higher differences in rewards raises at the lowest earnings levels. 
Our analysis is based on the sample of employed workers, 15-65 year olds, selected from the last 
available  wave  (year  2001)  of  the  European  Community  Household  Panel  (ECHP).  We  focus 
exclusively on employed people primarily because of the lack of satisfactory information on self-
employed workers (especially on earnings and hours of work), which makes rather difficult any 
comparison or unified treatment with employed workers.  
The ECHP allows to control for many demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
individuals and to derive different measures of human capital; in addition to providing information 
on the starting year of activity of every individual, which allows to determine her potential working 
experience, the dataset includes data on the number of years of working activity with the present 
firm. Therefore, we can separately evaluate the incidence on wages of general experience and firm-
specific experience. Furthermore, the survey provides detailed information on professions and some 
subjective evaluations on the degree of responsibility involved in the occupation. Finally, other 
characteristics related to working activity can also be observed, such as the type of contract, the size 
of the firm and the economic sector of activity.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief review of the literature on the 
evaluation  of  the  gender  pay  gap  in  Italy,  with  special  attention  to  the  latest  contributions.  In 
Section 3 we describe the distributive methodological approach to the analysis of the unexplained 
wage gap component of the gender wage gap. In Section 4 we describe the dataset and provide   7 
some  descriptive  statistics.  Earnings  function  estimates  and  the  distributive  analysis  of  the 
unexplained wage gap are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The wage gap due to differences in the rewards to characteristics. The Italian case  
Gender wage differentials have not been arousing in Italy as much interest among researchers as 
in other European countries, although institutions −at the national and European level− have been 
taking a great deal of attention to the issue and calling for strong initiatives at different levels. Only 
recently a few attempts to evaluate the Italian gender wage gap have been carried out; however, 
most of these studies relied on data which are not up to date and without taking proper account of 
the recent methodological developments in the field. 
Most of the literature on the Italian case has been relying on the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder 
method to decompose the raw wage gap and to evaluate the average of the component due to 
differences in rewards, that is labelled the “unexplained” part of the wage gap −because it is not 
justified by differences in characteristics−. Some of the most recent examples are Flabbi (1997 and 
2001),  ISTAT  (2005)  and  Comitato  Nazionale  Parità  e  Pari  Opportunità  (2001).  However,  the 
results of these studies strongly depend on the type of data employed in the analysis. Indeed,  most 
Italian surveys do not provide comparable information on wages; some collect data on gross rather 
than net earnings; some allow to indirectly construct hourly wages but many of them do not provide 
the necessary information to calculate the wage rate and estimations have to rely on total earnings. 
As a consequence, results can be very different from one study to another and some caution is 
needed while making comparisons and drawing general conclusions.  
Addis and Waldmann (1996), using the 1989 cross-section from the Bank of Italy Survey on 
Household,  Income  and  Wealth  (SHIW),  estimate  an  average  level  of  unexplained  wage 
differentials equal to 13%; the differential is evaluated with respect to yearly earnings net of taxes 
and  social  security  contributions.  By  using  the  same  survey,  but  on  year  1991,  Flabbi  (1997)   8 
evaluates a wage gap due to differences in rewards that ranges between 8 and 12 percentage points, 
depending on the population of reference and on the econometric method employed −either OLS or 
Instrumental  Variables.  The  same  author  estimates  in  1995  that  differences  in  the  rewards  to 
characteristics are responsible for a gap of 15% in net yearly earnings. He also shows how the 
percentage of the gap due to differences in the returns has not been changing across time: in 1977, 
out of a raw gap of 29.4 percentage points, 16% was attributed to differences in rewards; in 1995, 
despite a much lower raw wage gap than in the late 1970s (19.9%), the proportion attributed to 
differences in the rewards did decreased in an analogous way and still mounted to 15 percentage 
points. 
More recently, ISTAT (2005) has evaluated the average level of “unexplained” wage gap on data 
from the Italian Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) for year 2002. That survey provides gross 
hourly earnings for individuals employed by firms with at least ten employees in the industry and 
service sectors. The ISTAT study estimates an average component of the “unexplained” gender gap 
in gross hourly earnings equal to 11 percentage points. However, in the same year Rustichelli 
(2005) reports rather different results. Using the administrative data of the Istituto Nazionale della 
Previdenza Sociale (National Institute of Social Secuirity)
2 Rustichelli estimates a random-effect 
model  of  monthly  wages  controlling  for  the  level  of  bargaining  (national-  versus 
regional/provincial- or firm-level bargaining) and evaluates an average component of the wage gap 
due to differences in rewards to characteristics equal to almost 27%, out of an estimated average 
gap equal to 39%. 
A few years ago, the Italian Comitato Nazionale Parità e Pari Opportunità commissioned a group 
of Italian economists and sociologists a research on gender differences in pay. The results of this 
project have been published in 2001 (Comitato Nazionale Parità e Pari Opportunità, 2001). The 
economic section of the research has been carried out using data from the 1993 and 1995 waves of 
                             
2 These data are representative of the population of workers employed in the private sector during the 1996-2002 
period.   9 
the  European  Community  Household  Panel;  by  applying  the  Oaxaca-Blinder  methodology,  the 
research estimates a gender wage gap, due to unequal rewards to characteristics, equal to around 20 
percentage points in the first year of observation and 16 points in 1995.  
Recent international contributions to the field have suggested to analyse the extent of of the pay 
gap  at  different  points  of  the  wage  distribution.  Some  examples  are  Juhn,  Murphy  and  Pierce 
(1991), Fortin and Lemieux (1998) and Machado and Mata (2005). Other contributions propose to 
evaluate the level of wage differentials female-by-female to exactly determine the incidence of the 
unexplained wage gap at individual level and to study the relationship between each individual 
characteristic and the extent of wage differentials (Jenkins, 1994). However, very little work on 
Italian data has been taking distributional aspects into account. Addabbo and Favaro (2007) use data 
from the last available cross-section of the ECHP to evaluate the extension of the wage gap due to 
differences in rewards at different points of the distribution of female earnings, conditioning on the 
educational level. Using a quantile regression estimation procedure, they show that lowly educated 
women suffer a higher unexplained wage gap than highly educated colleagues across the whole 
distribution. However, while the authors find lowly educated females to be affected by a marked 
sticky-floor  effect,  they  show  some  evidence  of  a  glass-ceiling  pattern  among  highly  educated 
females. 
Favaro and Magrini (in press) study the distribution of the wage gap among young workers in 
North-eastern Italy. Following the methodological suggestions of Jenkins (1994), they develop a 
non-parametric estimation of bivariate density functions to evaluate the probability distribution of 
the wage gap for female workers. As will be clarified later, this method differs from previous ones 
inasmuch it allows to determine the range of the gap relative to any characteristic and to assign a 
probability to any level
3. Their results show that the component of the wage gap due to differences 
in rewards has been increasing through the 1990s across the whole distribution, but it has been more 
accentuated for females earning the highest wages. Therefore, a glass ceiling effect seems to have 
                             
3 The same method is applied in the present article and it will be discussed in the methodological Section of the paper.    10 
been emerging through the last decade: highly educated women suffer, in general, lower levels of 
differences in returns to characteristics than lowly educated females but experience much higher 
increases in the gaps on moving towards the top of the distribution. In addition, the accumulation of 
other human capital characteristics, such as experience and tenure in the firm, does not help women 
to close up the wage gap. 
The international literature has been contributing to enrich the analysis of the Italian gender 
wage gap; in fact, some comparative analyses have recently provided additional empirical results on 
the distribution of the gender pay differential in Italy. Arulampalam et al. (2005), for example, 
present quantile regression analyses on a sample of eleven European countries and focus on the 
wage gap in the private and public sector, separately. They confirm, for the Italian case, an unequal 
incidence −along the distribution of wages− of the proportion of the raw wage gap that is explained 
by  differences  in  the  returns  to  characteristics.  Moreover,  this  component  behaves  differently 
between private and public sectors: a higher proportion of wage gap due to differences in rewards to 
characteristics is estimated at both extremes of the private sector wage distribution; in contrast, 
female employees working in the public sector experience higher differences in rewards only at the 
top of the distribution. This result is common to most of the analysed countries. 
Beblo et al. (2003) apply Juhn, Murphy and Pierce decomposition method on wages estimated 
through the Lewbel two-step procedure and show that, for employees 25-55 years old who work at 
least 8 hours per week, the raw wag gap is almost stable across different deciles of the distribution. 
On the contrary, the part of the gap due to differences in remunerations of characteristics slowly 
decreases up till the median value and sharply declines thereafter.  
Olivetti and Petrongolo (2005) suggest a methodology to impute wages to individuals not in 
work, by making assumptions on the position of the imputed wage observations with respect to the 
median.  By  means  of  this  procedure,  Olivetti  and  Petrongolo  are  able  to  detect  the  impact  of 
selection on gender wage gaps by comparing estimated wage gaps on the base sample with those 
obtained on the sample enlarged with wage imputation. Using the ECHP and applying the Oaxaca-  11 
Blinder  decomposition  method,  they  estimate  an  average  gender  pay  gap  due  to  differences  in 
characteristics of around 12 percentage points. 
The study of the extent of the wage gap along the wage distribution has been drawing much 
attention in other European countries. So, Albrecht et al. (2003) have analysed the Swedish context, 
Albrecht et al. (2004) have applied the methodology to the Netherlands, and different analyses have 
been proposed on Spanish data [Garcìa et al. (2001), Gardeazàbal and Ugidos (2005), Del Rìo et al. 
(2006), De la Rica et al. (2005)].  
 
3. A distributive approach applied to the estimated marginal female wage functions 
The empirical research on gender wage differentials has been developing since the initial years 
of the 1970s, starting from the fundamental contribution of the works by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973). The original suggestion of the Oaxaca-Blinder’s methodology was that the observed gap 
between male and female wages can be decomposed into two different parts: the component due to 
differences in individual characteristics responsible for differences in labour productivity (the so 
called “explained” part of the gap), and the part due to gender differences in the rewards to those 
characteristics (the “unexplained” component of the differential); this second term is recognized as 
the discriminatory component of the wage gap though differences in the individual characteristics 
may themselves being determined by discrimination.  
The Oaxaca-Blinder approach provides a method to evaluate the unexplained part of the wage 
gap; the evaluation, however, is made in average terms, by applying OLS regression to estimate the 
rewards  to  individual  characteristics,  on  the  basis  of  which  an  index  of  discrimination  is 
constructed. As a consequence, the evaluation of discrimination is effectively reduced to an average 
prediction and the analysis is simplified to detect group discrimination, which means deterministic 
discrimination against minority groups, whose individuals are affected equally. As a consequence, 
the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology is not the proper instrument to evaluate stochastic (or individual)   12 
discrimination, which allows for individual deviations within a particular group and could arise 
because employers do not have perfect information and do not know the true productivity of each 
worker: since employers are imperfectly informed, they set wages relying on the characteristics they 
observe, which although related to productivity, do not perfectly represent productivity. Stochastic 
models predict both group discrimination – when the wage difference is evenly distributed across 
all levels of the observed characteristics – and individual discrimination, because of a different 
distribution of the characteristics within the different groups.  
The  inadequacy  of  the  O-B  methodology  to  evaluate  the  distribution  of  the  discriminatory 
component of the wage gap across individuals was first emphasized in the middle 1980s by Dolton 
and Makepeace (1987) and Munroe (1988) who highlighted the risk in using the Oaxaca-Blinder 
methodology  not  to  detect  any  discrimination  even  though  some  workers  were  effectively 
discriminated against. These authors highlighted the need for evaluating both the average value of 
discrimination  and  its  dispersion.  Building  on  these  contributions,  Jenkins  (1994)  developed  a 
method for analysing discrimination that makes use of the complete information contained in the 
distributions  of  estimated  and  reference  female  earnings.  The  method  he  proposes  entails  a 
comparison of the relative position of the Generalised Lorenz Curve (GLC) with respect to the 
Generalised Concentrations Curve (GCC), suggesting that discrimination exists whenever the GCC 
lies  above  the  GLC.  However,  while  supporting  the  call  for  ‘tractable  methods  of  presenting 
information  about  the  complete  distribution  of  discrimination  experience’  (Jenkins,  1994),  we 
believe  that  the  method  developed  by  Jenkins  falls  short  from  being  an  adequate  answer.  The 
fundamental problem in Jenkins’ method is that a GCC above the GLC does not necessarily imply 
discrimination against women along the whole distribution: by construction, the distance between 
the GCC and the GLC depends on cumulated differences between estimated and reference earnings, 
so that it can be positive even though the marginal contribution of one more female worker is 
negative. The effective contribution of Jenkins proposal to overcome Oaxaca-Blinder limitations is 
weakened  further;  in  fact,  while  proposing  to  compare  the  whole  distribution  of  predicted  and   13 
counterfactual female wages, the method adopts OLS estimates to construct those distributions, 
estimates which provide average evaluations of the rewards to the characteristics.  
It is only in the last few years that research on wage differentials has been able to advance with 
respect to the OLS methodology, by resorting to quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; 
Buchinsky, 1998). The quantile regression method, applied to the estimation of wage equations, 
consists in evaluating the rewards to individual characteristics by allowing for different values in 
correspondence of any chosen point across the wage distribution. The method has been applied to 
the wage differential analysis by Machado and Mata (2005) who developed a procedure to obtain 
the  marginal  distributions  of  female  predicted  and  counterfactual  wages,  once  the  vector  of 
coefficients of the wage equations is estimated. The Machado and Mata methodology has improved 
the power to explain the pattern of wage discrimination, since the level of discrimination (defined as 
the difference between the predicted wage and the counterfactual wage) can be observed across the 
whole female distribution; this allows to detect the likely uneven incidence of discrimination across 
individual characteristics. 
Based on these considerations, in this article we propose to combine the econometric analysis 
developed  by  Machado  and  Mata  (2005)  to  build  marginal  distributions  of  theoretical  and 
counterfactual wages, with an alternative method that evaluates the wage gap by focussing directly 
on the distributions of marginal estimated and reference earnings. The method we propose makes it 
possible  to  detect  both  group  and  individual  components  of  the  wage  gap,  and  to  assign  a 
probability of occurrence to any level of wage  diferential at any point in the distribution with 
respect to a given characteristic. This methodology has been used in a previous work where we 
studied wage differentials among young workers in North-eastern Italy (Favaro and Magrini, in 
press).  
Here, we focus only on the analysis of the component of the gap due to differences in rewards to 
characteristics, the so called “unexplained” part of the pay gap, and try to detect its incidence across   14 
the  distribution  of  wages  by  different  educational  levels.  The  econometric  method  and  the 
distributive methodology we propose for doing so can be described as follows. 
The quantile regression method consists in estimating wage equations at different points of the 
relative wage distribution. Given the covariates vector z, quantile regression allows to estimate 
( ) z ù Qè ,  corresponding  to  the  è -th  quantile  of  the  distribution  of  the  log  wage  ( ),  at  any 
( ) 0,1 è   . The quantile regression model is assumed to be linear: 
    +     =   u z                   (1) 
Where      is  the  log  of  wages  and        is  a  vector  of  coefficients,  the  quantile  regression 
coefficients. The distribution of the error term    u  is unspecified and it is simply assumed that 
( ) 0 = z u Q     . 
The estimated values of the è -th quantile of the log wages, conditioned to covariates z, is equal 
to:  ( )         ˆ z z Q   = . 
For any  ( ) 0,1 è   ,  è â  can be estimated by minimising in  è â  the following expression: 
( ) â z ù ñ n i i
n
i




1                 (2) 
where: 















               (3) 
The  vector  of  coefficients  è â   can  be  obtained  by  estimating  each  equation  separately  or 
simultaneously. The simultaneous procedure allows to obtain an estimate of the entire variance-
covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients, which is necessary to implement the testing analysis 
of inter-quantile difference of coefficients
4. Following the above described procedure, we estimate 
                             
4 The bootstrapping procedure allows us to test whether coefficients of different quantile regressions are significantly 
different.   15 
the rewards to worker characteristics, by specifying different models for females and males; thus, 
we obtain a vector of estimated quantile coefficients for female workers, 
f è â ˆ  and a vector of 
estimated quantile coefficients for male workers, 
m è â ˆ . 
Given  the  estimated  coefficients,  we  derive  the  marginal  distributions  of  the  predicted 
(theoretical) and the counterfactual female wages by applying the methodology adopted by Albrecht 
et al. (2003)
5. Female predicted wages are theoretical wages that females  can earn given their 
characteristics  and  the  rewards  recognised  to  female  workers;  on  the  other  way,  female 
counterfactual wages are wages that women would be paid if female characteristics were rewarded 
at male returns. In order to construct predicted and counterfactual distributions of wages, we need to 
simulate a random distribution of characteristics. We proceed as follows: 
•  We  take  a  draw  from  the  female  database  and  construct  a  predicted  wage  by  multiplying 
characteristics  f z  of the selected individual by the relative estimated coefficients, 
f è â ˆ , for a 
given quantile è . We repeat that operation N=100 times with respect to every quantile, ending 
up with the estimated marginal distribution of female predicted wages.  
•  We repeat the procedure described above, but this time we apply male coefficients, 
m è â ˆ , to 
female characteristics,  f z . Then, we obtain the marginal distribution of female counterfactual 
wages. 
•  The  difference  between  the  constructed  marginal  distributions  represents  the  “unexplained” 
component of the wage gap, that means the part of the wage differential not justified by gender 
differences in the characteristics, which is the component of the wage gap we have planned to 
analyse and that we will simply call “wage gap” (or “wage differential” or “pay gap”), for 
simplifying the reading.  
 
                             
5 Albrecht et al. (2003) adopt a simplified version of the methodology proposed by J.A.F. Machado and J. Mata in a 
mimeo that was later published in the Journal of Applied Econometrics (Machado and Mata, 2005).   16 
Having  constructed  the  marginal  distributions  of  cross-female  predicted  and  counterfactual 
wages,  we  then  proceed  in  analysing  the  incidence  of  the  wage  gap  conditional  on  estimated 
earnings  and  to  different  observed  characteristics  −mainly  human  capital  characteristics−  by 
estimating non-parametrically the probability distribution of wage differentials conditional on the 
distribution of estimated earnings and of relevant factors or characteristics.  
 
 
Let us indicate with di the estimated level of wage differential for observation (i.e., female 
worker) i and with xi the corresponding level of any relevant factor or characteristic we want to 
analyse jointly to the wage gap. Then denote by F(d) the distribution of the wage differential and 
with F(x) the distribution of the variable x. Next, suppose these distributions can be described by 
density function, which can be indicated with f(d) and f(x) respectively. What we are interested in is 
the relationship between the two distributions; this can be simply written as 




dx x f   x   |   d f ) d ( f           (4) 
where  x)   |   (d   f   is  the  density  of  the  wage  gap  conditional  on  the  level  x  for  the  factor  or 
characteristic of interest.
6  
From an operational point of view, we obtain an estimate of  x)   |   (d   f  in three steps. First, we 
estimate non-parametrically the joint distribution of d and x, using a bivariate product kernel density 
estimator: 
( )  
=
   
 
 
   
 














x , d f ˆ
1
1
        (5) 
where K(.) is the kernel function, while  d h  and  x h  are the kernel bandwidths.
7 Next, we obtain an 
estimate of the marginal distribution  ( ) x f  by numerically integrating the joint distribution with 
                             
6 For a more general description of the method see Favaro and Magrini (in press).   17 
respect to the wage gap
8. Finally, we obtain the estimate of  x)   |   (d   f , the distribution of the pay 
differential conditional on estimated earnings or any characteristic of interest, by dividing the joint 
distribution by the marginal one
9: 
( ) ( )
( ) x f ˆ
d,x f ˆ
d|x f ˆ =             (6) 
The incidence and direction of the wage gap can thus be studied by analysing directly the shape 
of the three-dimensional plot of the conditional distribution estimate and of the corresponding two-
dimensional contour plot. In particular, the actual way in which this can be accomplished depends 
on whether the conditioning characteristics can be measured on a continuous space, as in the case of 
estimated earnings or of general experience accumulated during the individual’s working history, or 
they should rather be represented as categorical or dummy variables, as in the case of the education 
level or of experience accumulated inside the firm
10.  
As for the interpretation of the results in the case in which worker’s characteristics are measured 
on a continuous space (and, therefore, also in the case we focus on the relationship between wage 
differentials  and  estimated  earnings),  the  absence  of  differencs  in  rewards  to  characteristics  is 
represented  by  a  concentration  of  the  probability  mass  along  the  line  running  parallel  to  the 
characteristic’s axis and in correspondence to a wage gap equal to zero. As a consequence, evidence 
of differences in rewards against (in favour of) female workers is signalled by a probability mass 
lying above (below) this horizontal line. In contrast, when the characteristic of interest presents l 
levels so that the individuals can thus be divided into l mutually exclusive subsets, we estimate l 
different stochastic kernels as in equation (6). Each of these stochastic kernels therefore shows the 
                                                                                          
7 To estimate the joint distribution, we use a Gaussian product kernel with bandwidths chosen optimally according to 
Silverman (1986). 
8 In this, we follow the procedure originally suggested by Quah (1996). As an alternative, the marginal distribution is 
often estimated directly using a univariate kernel. However, as pointed out by Overman and Ioannides (2001), the two 
estimators have identical asymptotic statistical properties and produce very similar results in practice. 
9 Under regularity conditions, this represents a consistent estimator for the conditional distribution (Rosenblatt, 1971; 
Silverman, 1986; Quah, 1996; Chen, Linton and Robinson, 2001). 
10 As we are going to explain later in the paper, ECHP data do not contain a continuous variable measuring tenure and 
we are obligated to include experience accumulated inside a firm as three dummy variables.   18 
distribution  of  the  wage  gap  conditional  on  estimated  earnings,  for  a  given  level  of  the 
characteristic.  Moreover,  direct  comparisons  between  the  estimates  for  different  levels  of  the 
characteristic indicate how the conditional distribution is affected by changes in the level of the 
characteristic. 
 
4.  The dataset  
The analysis is carried out on a sample of employed workers aged 15 to 65 selected from the 8
th 
wave
11 of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP); we do not include the group of self-
employed workers due to the unsatisfactory level of information on their earnings and hours of 
work, which makes the comparison with employed workers rather difficult.  
The model we estimate assumes that the wage level is affected by individual characteristics and 
other characteristics linked to the demand side of the labour market, such as the size of the firm, the 
sector of activity, the type of contract and the reference regional context. Regarding individual 
characteristics, the ECHP provides information on several factors of significant interest to evaluate 
individual human capital endowment; in particular, we can rely on data on education, the starting 
year  of  working  activity,  the  number  of  years  of  experience  in  the  actual  firm,  the  level  of 
supervisory  responsibility  in  current  job  and  the  professional  category.  In  addition,  the  survey 
supplies some key demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals, such as age, 
sex, marital status and family composition.  
The focus of the paper is on wage differentials conditional on educational levels; therefore, we 
analyse two different subsamples of workers. The first includes workers with an educational level 
equal or higher than a “second stage of secondary level education (ISCED 3 or ISCED 5-7)”, which 
in Italy is equivalent to having at least a diploma of “Scuola secondaria superiore”
12; we label this 
group  of  workers  as  “highly  educated”.  It  is  important  to  note  that,  when  working  on  this 
                             
11 This is the most recent available wave, referring to year 2001. 
12 Upper-secondary school corresponds to post- compulsory school. Individuals are asked to choose whether to continue 
studying when they are 13 years old.    19 
subsample,  we  are  actually  studying  individuals  with  either  a  diploma  of  “Scuola  secondaria 
superiore” or a university degree. Consequently, in the estimation of the earning functions for this 
subsample, we take the group of individuals with a diploma of “Scuola secondaria superiore” as 
the reference category and add among the regressors a dummy variable reflecting the achievement 
of a university degree. The second subsample of workers comprises those who completed a primary 
stage of education and we label them as “lowly educated”.  
In addition to education, we are able to control for human capital characteristics acquired in the 
labour market. The ECHP collects information on the year of individual first entrance in the labour 
market; by using that information, we construct the number of years of potential experience any 
worker could have accumulated as since her first working experience. Some caution is generally 
needed when using such a “theoretical” measure of experience in analyses on wages and gender 
differentials: the measure may not correspond to the effective years spent in the labour market 
because  it  does  not  take  into  account  periods  of  absence  from  the  labour  market,  owing  to 
unemployment,  inactivity,  or  simply  illness  or  parenthood.  If  this  were  the  case,  potential 
experience would overestimate the real number of years of working activity. In general, such a 
measurement  problem  arises  both  for  males  and  females;  however,  as  the  empirical  evidence 
suggests, the problem is more serious for females, due to the interruption connected with maternity. 
We try to address the issue by adding, among the explicatory variables, the interaction of potential 
experience with the number of children. If it is true that having children implies some penalty in 
terms of experience, we should detect a negative impact of that variable on the level of wages and 
to solve, at least partially, the problem. 
We complete the information on individual human capital endowment by taking into account the 
period of permanence in the current firm, that we call “tenure”. Unfortunately, the European survey 
does not provide the precise number of years of tenure for all workers, but only for those that have 
been working in the same firm for less than fifteen years. As a consequence, we are not able to 
know the exact period of permanence when workers have been in the present firm for more than   20 
fifteen years. So, in order to normalize information, we are forced to use dummy variables that 
capture the effect of different periods of time: we construct four different intervals corresponding to 
a period of tenure shorter or equal to five years, longer than five but shorter or equal to ten years, 
between eleven and fifteen years and longer than fifteen years. 
Human capital characteristics are expected to positively affect the level of wages. However, the 
extent  of  their  effect  can  reasonably  be  correlated  with  other  job  characteristics,  such  as  the 
occupation category and the degree of responsibility concerning that occupation; it is therefore 
necessary to control for these factors to avoid either overestimation or underestimation (depending 
on the occupation) of the returns to human capital. Given that the ECHP survey provides a rather 
detailed classification of occupational categories, we include among our variables a dummy for 
each type of occupation listed in the dataset
13. Moreover, since individuals in paid employment are 
asked  whether  they  have  “a  supervisory  role”,  “some  intermediate  supervisory  role”  or  a  “no 
supervisory role”, we construct two dummies to capture the effect on the level of wages of the level 
of  supervisory  responsibility.  A  positive  sign  is  obviously  expected  as  a  reward  to  a  higher 
responsibility. 
The literature on earnings and wage differentials provides good evidence of the impact of the 
sector of activity and contract conditions on wage levels: working in service activities generally 
guarantees a higher average wage than does working in the industry and agriculture sector. On the 
other hand, it is widely shown that earnings of Italian female workers employed in the public sector 
are normally higher than those of private employees. Therefore, in the econometric analysis we add 
dummies for macrosectors of activity and for public sector workers.  
                             
13 We control for the following professional categories: physical, mathematical, engineering, life science and health 
professionals, teaching professionals, other professionals; physical, mathematical, engineering, life science and health 
associate professionals, teaching and other technical professionals; office and customer services clerks; personal and 
protective services workers; models, salespersons and demonstrators; skilled agricultural and fishery workers; craft and 
related trades, and extraction and building trade workers; metal, machinery, precision, handicraft, craft printing and 
related  trades  workers.  These  occupational  dummies  have  been  included  among  the  regressors  of  the  econometric 
model while the reference category is “Sales and services elementary occupations”.   21 
As a matter of fact, Italian wage rates seem to be correlated to the weekly amount of hours of 
work and to the length of the contract. Consequently, we try to capture the incidence of these 
contractual conditions by adding controls for the length of the contract −distinguishing permanent 
employment  from  fixed-term,  short-term  contracts  and  from  other  types  of  employment 
contracts
14− and for part-time work
15. Finally, we account for the size of the firm and for regional 
effects.  
Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes some information about the sample. In general, female 
workers, either highly- or lowly educated, work a lower number of hours than their male colleagues. 
As  for  human  capital  characteristics,  we  observe  a  rather  different  composition  by  sex  of  the 
subsample  of  highly  educated:  the  proportion  of  women  with  university  education  is  almost  2 
percentage points lower than the proportion of males with the same level of education. On the other 
hand,  we  do  not  observe  any  relevant  difference  by  sex  in  accumulated  general  or  specific 
experience. As expected, highly educated workers independently of sex, display a shorter average 
period of work than lowly educated employees.  
Accessing supervisory positions is rather uncommon among lowly educated employees as only 
3% of females and 4.7% of men have a high supervisory role in their occupations. The proportion is 
slightly higher (7.6% for females and 10% for males) when considering only an average level of 
supervision. The difference by sex in accessing responsibility positions is substantial when we look 
at  highly  educated  employees
16:  only  6%  of  women,  compared  to  16.4%  of  men,  exercise  a 
significant supervisory role while 12.4% of women and 20.5% of men have an average level of 
supervision responsibility. 
As expected, we observe a higher concentration of women in part-time work, especially for those 
with a low educational level. On the other hand, compared to a much higher concentration of 
                             
14 We summarise in the category “other type of contract” the categories defined by the ECHP as “casual work with no 
contract” and “other arrangement”. 
15 We summarise in the category “other type of contract” the categories defined by the ECHP as “casual work with no 
contract” and “other arrangement”. 
16 This is consistent with the existence of vertical occupational segregation by gender in Italy (Rosti, 2006).   22 
females than males in the public sector conditional on highly-education, we surprisingly detect a 
rather similar proportion of lowly educated employees in public employment, independently of sex. 
 
5.  The distributional analysis 
Before moving to the main focus of our study −the distributional analysis− we spend a few 
words on the estimation results that are reported in the Appendix
17.  
According to these results, there appear to be interesting differences between the rewards to the 
characteristics  of  highly  educated  (Table  A2a)  and  lowly  educated  (Table  A2b)  females, 
particularly with reference to human capital attributes. General experience, for example, does have 
a  significant  effect  on  wages  of  lowly  educated  females  but  only  at  very  high  levels;  on  the 
contrary,  highly  educated  women  obtain  a  significant  reward  to  experience  accumulated  in  the 
labour  market  only  if  their  wages  are  lower  than  the  median  value.  In  addition,  the  estimated 
coefficient  of  the  interaction  between  “experience”  and    “number  of  children”,  capturing  the 
measure of penalty that female workers would suffer when having children, is not significant for 
less-educated women. It becomes significant and negative for highly educated women up till the 
median level.  
Returns to tenure are generally statistically not  significant in the sample of lowly educated 
females; on the contrary returns are significant for low-earning highly educated women and the rate 
increases as wages raise from the lowest decile to the median level. 
Having some supervisory role positively affects the level of wages in both cases, but not along 
the whole wage distribution; indeed, lowly educated women have some advantage only if their 
wages are not too high, precisely lower than or equal to the median value. Highly educated females, 
on the contrary, gain independently of the wage level. However, the reward is higher in the sample 
                             
17 For an extensive discussion of the estimates, see Addabbo and Favaro (2007).   23 
of lowly educated women, amounting to twice the return estimated in the highly educated female 
sample.  
On  the  other  hand,  having  a  relevant  supervisory  role  does  not,  in  general,  guarantee  any 
economic  advantage  to  lowly  educated  females,  with  the  exception  of  those  earning  very  high 
wages (at the highest decile of the distribution); differently, highly educated women with high 
supervisory roles can earn higher wages along the whole distribution and the gain increases as the 
wage rises. 
Moreover, we observe some fundamental differences between female and male coefficients, 
both in the level of statistical significance and in the extent of their incidence on wages
18.  
As for highly educated workers (Tables A2a and A3a), it is a matter of fact that having a 
university educational level implies higher wages, independently of sex; besides, the highest the 
wage the larger the effect. However, rewards to university education are much lower in the female 
than in the male sample, with the only exception of the highest decile of the distribution; in that 
case, highly educated females are rewarded as much as their male colleagues. Females, however, 
show  some  advantage  to  acquire  either  general  or  specific  experience.  The  permanence  in  the 
labour market has a significant and positive incidence only on the left-hand part of both female and 
male  distributions;  however,  we  detect  higher  rewards  to  females.  On  the  other  hand,  specific 
experience accumulated in the present firm does not appear to significantly affect male wages. 
Indeed, the opposite is true for females: the longer they work in the same firm, the higher the wage, 
in particular for high-earning ones.   
As we showed in Section 4, females accessing supervisory positions are rather uncommon. In 
addition to that, females who achieve such responsibilities do not obtain a compensation as high as 
males do. The disadvantage is particularly significant if we compare men and women with a high 
supervisory role.  
                             
18 See Addabbo and Favaro (2007) for tests on the statistical difference between male and female coefficients.   24 
Looking at the coefficients of lowly educated workers (Tables A2b and A3b), we see noticeable 
differences in comparison with highly educated  employees. General experience turns out to be 
insignificant for female workers, except when they reach very high wage levels (at the highest 
decile  of  the  distribution);  in  contrast,  the  positive  effect  of  acquiring  general  skills  does 
significantly affect the whole distribution of male wages, but the last quantile. Also with respect to 
tenure we find completely different results according to the level of education: for lowly educated 
workers, specific experience acquired in the present firm does not affect female wages, at any level 
of  observation,  but  positively  influences  −with  a  larger  impact  in  correspondence  to  a  longer 
tenure− the wages of males.  
We can now move to the investigation of the  wage gap based on the distribution approach. 
Before proceeding, two things must be noted in order to ease the interpretation of the results. First 
of all, the “unexplained” wage gap, calculated as the difference between females’ estimated and 
counterfactual earnings, is here expressed in percentage terms with respect to estimated earnings. 
Secondly, the lines reported in all contour plots are percentage contour lines. In particular, the value 
adjacent to each line indicates the percentage of the density volume that lays above (on the vertical 
axis of the three-dimensional plot) the line itself. So, areas enclosed within a low-value line are in 
fact associated with a high conditional probability level and thus enable us to identify the peaks of 
the conditional probability density. 
The first step is represented by the study of the probability of the wage gap conditional on estimated 
earnings for different levels of education. In particular, Figure 1 shows both the three-dimensional 
and the contour plots
19 of the kernel estimates corresponding to low− (upper panes) and highly− 
(lower panes) educated females. Several important features appear to emerge.  
First, all estimates suggest the existence of substantial wage differences against female workers as a 
large share of the conditional density mass is positioned above the horizontal line for both levels of 
                             
19 The contour lines reported in all contour plots are percentage contour lines. In particular, the value adjacent to each 
line indicates the percentage of the density volume above (on the vertical axis of the three-dimensional plot) the line 
itself.   25 
education.  Second,  the  extent  of  the  gap  decreases  as  estimated  earnings  increase  for  female 
workers with a low education level, as it can be inferred from the fact that the corresponding density 
mass is downward sloping. In contrast, such a negative relationship between differences in rewards 
to characteristics and estimated earnings cannot be found for highly educated workers. Third, there 
appear to be substantial differences among education levels with respect to the variability of the 
phenomenon along the range of estimated earnings. To see this, let us focus on the 0.9 contour line, 
starting from lowly educated workers. In this case, we can notice that the variability of the wage 
gap is extremely high for low estimated earnings and decreases as estimated earnings increase. In 
contrast,  the  extent  of  the  relative  wage  gap  for  highly-educated  workers  appears  to  be  more 
homogenously distributed along the earnings range, being substantially between lower levels. 
A final interesting feature that emerges from Figure 1 is that the overall conditional probability 
of experiencing wage differentials against appears to be higher for females with high education 
levels. A first indication of this feature can be obtained by looking at the position of the peaks of the 
conditional probability densities as identified by the 0.1 contour lines: while the peaks for lowly 
educated workers lay underneath the horizontal line, the peaks for highly educated are positioned 
clearly above it. But, the significance of these feature is also confirmed by the calculations reported 
in Table 1. Indeed, along with the visual inspection of the kernel estimates, an assessment of the 
incidence of the wage gap can be performed by calculating the share of the volume of the estimated 
conditional density that lies above the horizontal line. Such a measure can thus be interpreted as the 
cumulative  conditional  probability  of  wage  differences  against  female  workers.  Hence,  a  value 
higher  (lower)  than  50%  can  be  seen  as  evidence  of  wage  gaps  against  (in  favour  of)  female 
workers. Additionally, making use of horizontal lines with a positive intercept, we can decompose 
this measure according to the incidence of the gap relative to estimated earnings. Looking now at 
the results reported in the table we can then see that the cumulative probability of wage gaps against 
women  is  equal  to  81.66%  for  highly  educated  and  to  66.08%  for  lowly  educated  workers. 
Moreover, while the cumulative probability of wage differentials against women in excess of 10%   26 
of their estimated earnings is rather similar among the two groups (with values around 50%), the 
cumulative probability of pay gaps against women between 0 and 10% of their estimated earnings is 
equal to only 17.05% for low education workers, compared to a value of 29.20% for high education 
workers. 
 
[Figure 1 and Table 1 around here] 
 
In the methodological Section we pointed out that, whenever an individual characteristic can be 
measured on a continuous space, we can estimate directly the probability of wage differentials 
conditional to the values of the chosen characteristic. So, Figure 2 reports the estimated conditional 
density functions of the pay gap with respect to the years of potential experience accumulated in the 
labour market prior to the present occupation, again distinguishing between low and high education 
levels. While the conditional densities are predominantly positioned in the part of the ( ˆ ˆ d,x) plane 
corresponding  to  wage  differences  against  female  workers  both  for  high  and  low  levels  of 
education,  the  variability  of  the  gap  appears  to  be  sensibly  wider  for  lowly  educated  females. 
However, looking at the position of the densities’ crests in the three-dimensional plots, it appears 
that a wage gap of approximately 10% of the estimated earnings is the most likely outcome at all 
levels of experience and education. However, the slope of these crests and the positions of the peaks 
suggest that, for high education workers, the probability of suffering this level of wage gap tends to 
increase with the level of experience.  
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
Finally, we can see the results that can be drawn from the analysis of the relation between wage 
gaps and workers’ tenure. However, before looking at the estimates, it must be noted that here we 
have chosen to follow a different way of partitioning the experience accumulated inside a firm with   27 
respect to the one adopted while estimating the wage equations. On that occasion, we constructed 
four separate dummy variables – corresponding to tenure levels between 0 and 5 years, between 6 
and 10 years, between 11 and 15 years, and of more than 15 years – and excluded the first from the 
analysis.  Here,  in  order  to  make  use  of  all  available  observations  and  to  distribute  them  as 
homogenously as possible, we grouped the dummies into two simple categories. So, while Figure 3 
reports the estimated density function of the wage gap conditional to estimated earnings for female 
workers with a tenure of 10 years or less, Figure 4 reports the corresponding estimate for workers 
with a tenure of 11 years or more.  
The general picture that emerges from these Figures is quite unambiguous. Once more, we find 
significant evidence of a substantial degree of pay differences against female workers given that all 
reported  densities  lay  well  above  the  horizontal  line.  Besides,  through  these  estimates  we  can 
further  qualify  one  of  the  features  noticed  from  the  analysis  of  Figure  1.  There,  we  noted  the 
existence of a negative relationship between the extent of the wage gap and the level of estimated 
earnings for lowly educated females. Looking at the upper panes of Figures 3 and 4, we can see that 
this feature is substantially confirmed for both tenure categories. At the same time, the lower panes 
of the figures also confirm the absence of such a negative relationship for high education workers. 
However,  other  interesting  features  can  be  recognised  through  a  more  detailed  comparison 
between the two tenure categories. Concentrating on the estimates for low education levels, we can 
observe  that,  for  workers  with  a  tenure  period  that  exceeds  11  years,  the  differences  in  the 
behaviour of the wage gap along the range of estimated earnings are more evident. In particular, we 
can clearly notice the presence of significant gaps in their favour for relatively high earnings (and, 
in particular, for earnings in excess of approximately 38 thousand euros), given that both peaks in 
the conditional density estimate are positioned below the horizontal line (Figure 4, upper panes). In 
contrast, one of the two corresponding peaks in the density estimate for workers with shorter tenure 
periods (Figure 3, upper panes) remains above the horizontal line. Moving now to the estimates for 
high education levels, we can notice that, while female workers with tenure periods of 11 years or   28 
more are characterised by a total absence of pay gaps in their favour for relatively high levels of 
estimated earnings (Figure 4, lower panes), this phenomenon is instead significantly present for 
workers with shorter tenure periods. 
 
[Figures 3 and 4 around here]  
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we evaluate the gender pay gap due to differences in returns to characteristics by 
suggesting a distributional approach. In particular, the method assigns a probability of occurrence to 
any level of discrimination conditional to any level of a given factor or characteristic. 
The  analysis  shows  that  differences  in  pay  due  to  differences  in  rewards  to  characteristics 
between  Italian  men  and  women  are  not  evenly  distributed  among  workers  with  different 
educational endowments. Women achieving the highest educational levels experience lower pay 
gaps compared to their colleagues with lower education; more precisely, the probability distribution 
of the pay gap conditional on the distribution of earnings of highly educated females is concentrated 
on lower wage differentials than the distribution concerning lowly educated females. However, the 
variability of the wage gap along the range of estimated earnings is different: for lowly educated 
females,  the  gap  is  extremely  high  in  correspondence  of  low  earning  levels  and  decreases  as 
earnings increase. On the other hand, for highly educated females the variability decreases only at 
very high wage levels; still, in correspondence of these higher wages, the probability distribution 
shifts upwards, showing that gender differences in the returns to characteristics are higher and more 
likely to occur in correspondence of highly educated women reaching the top of earnings. These 
results  confirm  that  in  Italy,  as  elsewhere,  there  is  a  different  pattern  of  wage  discrimination 
affecting female workers in line with their educational endowment. Females with an educational   29 
level lower than an upper secondary-school diploma experience some sticky-floor pattern; on the 
contrary, highly-educated female wages are affected by some glass-ceiling pattern. 
Our study also suggests interesting results when interacting education with other human capital 
characteristics. In summary, we find that lowly educated women can suffer lower gender pay gaps 
due to differences in rewards to characteristics as they achieve longer labour market experience and 
longer permanence in the firm. In contrast, the gender gap in rewards for highly educated females 
worsens up as their experience, either general or specific, increases.  
Although our method clearly differs from those recently applied by other authors to several 
European countries and that rely on the comparison between predicted and counterfactual female 
marginal wage distributions, our findings on the Italian case have some points in common with 
theirs: indeed, we detect some patterns of sticky floor in the sample of lowly educated females and 
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Incidence of women’s discrimination 
 
Women’s discrimination  Education Level 
against / in favour  relative to estimated 
wage  High  Low 
over 10%  52.47 %  48.02 % 
between 5% and 10%  16.26 %  9.11 %  against 
between 0 and 5%  12.94 %  8.94 % 
in favour    18.34 %  33.92 % 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 


































































































































/PUFT  %JTDSJNJOBUJPO JT FYQSFTTFE JO QFSDFOUBHF UFSNT XJUI SFTQFDU UP FTUJNBUFE 
FBSOJOHT 
  &TUJNBUFT VTF B  (BVTTJBO LFSOFM  XJUI  CBOEXJEUI  DIPTFO PQUJNBMMZ 	4JMWFSNBO 

 
   36 
Figure 3 
Probability density functions of discrimination conditional to estimated earnings  
(for tenure of 10 years or less) 
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Figure 4 
Probability density functions of discrimination conditional to estimated earnings  
(for tenure of 11 years or more) 
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Appendix 
Table A1.Sample descriptive statistics. Employees 16-65 years old.  
  Highly educated  Lowly educated 
  Women  Men  Women  Men 
  Average  St.Dev.  Average  St.Dev.  Average  St.Dev.  Average  St.Dev. 
Log yearlywage  9.9744  0.54  10.24218  0.52  9.6396  0.58  9.9861  0.54 
Log months worked   2.3972  0.34  2.4328  0.24  2.3403  0.37  2.3923  0.33 
Log hours worked   3.4853  0.30  3.6497  0.20  3.5153  0.33  3.6875  0.19 
Upper-secondary education  0.8236  0.38  0.8072  0.39  -  -  -  - 
University education  0.1763  0.38  0.1928  0.30  -  -  -  - 
Experience  14.3949  9.96  15.3319  10.59  20.9120  12.33  19.8974  12.048 
Experience squared  306.2994  353.13  347.1322  382.01  589.1104  551.62  540.9266  530.81 
Experience*Children  5.5667  8.15  6.0073  9.24  5.1966  9.17  6.8674  10.31 
Average supervisory level  0.1240  0.33  0.2056  0.40  0.0764  0.27  0.1013  0.30 
High supervisory level  0.0664  0.25  0.1648  0.37  0.0310  0.17  0.0476  0.21 
                 
Reference group: 
Tenure 0-5 years 
               
Tenure 6-10 years  0.1569  0.36  0.1567  0.36  0.1288  0.33  0.1143  0.32 
Tenure 11-15 years  0.1109  0.31  0.1099  0.31  0.1171  0.32  0.0952  0.29 
Tenure more than 15 years   0.3261  0.47  0.3562  0.48  0.3115  0.46  0.3324  0.47 
                 
Public Sector  0.5277  0.50  0.3928  0.49  0.1832  0.38  0.2298  0.42 
                 
Industry  0.1324  0.34  0.3213  0.47  0.3175  0.47  0.4868  0.50 
Services  0.8641  0.34  0.6531  0.48  0.6199  0.49  0.4429  0.50 
                 
Reference group:  
Full-time 
               
Part-time  0.0747  0.26  0.0176  0.13  0.1377  0.34  0.0154  0.12 
Fixed-term or short-term 
contract 
0.0770  0.27  0.0565  0.23  0.1152  0.32  0.0739  0.26 
Other contract  0.0332  0.18  0.0283  0.17  0.0905  0.29  0.0800  0.27 
                 
Reference group: 
Firm size: 5-19 employees 
               
Firm size: 20-49 employees  0.1697  0.38  0.1889  0.39  0.1479  0.35  0.1313  0.34 
Firm size 50-99 employees  0.1231  0.33  0.1192  0.32  0.0817  0.27  0.0784  0.27 
Firm size 100-499 
employees 
0.1469  0.35  0.1687  0.37  0.1015  0.30  0.1048  0.31 
Firm size: more than 500 
employees 
0.0862  0.28  0.1507  0.36  0.0618  0.24  0.0875  0.28 
North-west  0.0984  0.30  0.0949  0.29  0.0631  0.24  0.0646  0.25 
North-east  0.0984  0.30  0.0931  0.29  0.0987  0.30  0.0771  0.27 
South and Islands  0.3207  0.47  0.3236  0.467  0.4115  0.49  0.4074  0.49 
Source: Descriptive statistics on ECHP 2001 sample    39 
Table A2a. Quantile regressions – Highly educated women 16-65 years old 
Dep. variable: log income from work  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Log months worked  1.191***  1.114***  1.128***  .992 ***  .766*** 
  (6.09)  (7.18)  (10.82)  (10.41)  (4.60) 
Log hours worked  .339***  .144*  .167***  .216***  .311*** 
  (2.82)  (1.68)  (3.56)  (3.32)  (3.28) 
Married/cohabitating  -.002  .-.011  -.004  .010  .007 
  (-0.06)  (-0.43)  (-0.19)  (0.35)  (0.24) 
University education  .033  .075**  .114***  .143***  .223*** 
  (0.77)  (2.39)  (4.49)  (4.33)  (4.36) 
Experience  .026***  .013**  .007*  .000  .001 
  (2.84)  (2.51)  (1.76)  (0.00)  (0.21) 
Squared experience  -.000***  -.000  -.000.  .000  -.000 
  (-2.31)  (-1.39)  (-0.37)  (0.65)  (-0.45) 
Experience*Children  -.003*  -.002  -.002*  -.000  -.000 
  (-1.69)  (-1.62)  (-1.72)  (-0.05)  (-0.03) 
Average supervisory level  .094**  .077**  .092***  .063*  .046* 
  (2.23)  (2.51)  (3.91)  (1.83)  (1.06) 
High supervisory level  .110**  .038  .148***  .195***  .280*** 
  (2.17)  (0.73)  (2.78)  (2.54)  (3.96) 
Tenure 6-10 years  .099  .073*  .075***  .048*  .032 
  (1.50)  (1.89)  (3.08)  (1.67)  (0.75) 
Tenure 11-15 years  .047  .088**  .102***  .067**  .084 
  (0.56)  (2.02)  (3.32)  (2.16)  (1.42) 
Tenure more than 15 years  .075  .088**  .059**  .112***  .208*** 
  (0.91)  (2.28)  (2.10)  (2.51)  (3.40) 
Public sector  .163***  .097***  .056**  -.018  -.035 
  (3..01)  (3.36)  (2.15)  (-0.51)  (-0.84) 
Agriculture  -.611  -.1.101**  .067  .061.  -.087 
  (-1.38)  (-2.00)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (-0.17) 
Services  -.066  -.076**  -.025  .009  .004 
  (-0.87)  (-2.04)  (-0.79)  (0.19)  (0.08) 
Part-time  -.246**  -.347***  -.308***  -.199***  -.065 
  (-2.10)  (-4.44)  (-6.86)  (-2.82)  (-0.61) 
Fixed-term or short-term contract  -.241**  .001  -.058  -.097**  -.109* 
  (-1.95)  (0.01)  (-1.62)  (-2.37)  (-1.84) 
Other type of contract*  -.279  -.207  -.100  -.080  -.051 
  (-1.14)  (-1.03)  (-0.93)  (-0.67)  (-0.44) 
Firm size: 5-19 employees  .056  .029  .046*  .051  .123** 
  (0.78)  (0.83)  (1.88)  (1.51)  (2.48) 
Firm size: 20-49 employees  ..101  .033  .064**  .094**  .138*** 
  (1.51)  (0.97)  (2.31)  (2.10)  (2.68) 
Firm size 50-99 employees  .121  .051  .079***  .070*  .102** 
  (1.53)  (1.26)  (2.77)  (1.69)  (1.98) 
Firm size 100-499 employees  .053  .028  .064**  .083*  .130** 
  (0.73)  (0.75)  (2.49)  (1.87)  (2.23) 
Firm size: more than 500 employees  .132  .058  .122***  .115***  .215*** 
  (1.49)  (1.20)  (3.77)  (2.51)  (3.29) 
North-west  .068  .047  .058**  .080*  .124*** 
  (1.17)  (1.16)  (1.92)  (1.93)  (2.65) 
North-east  .131***  .082***  .030  .012  .038 
  (3.22)  (3.23)  (1.42)  (0.38)  (0.77) 
South and Islands  -.077*  -.041  -.035*  .005  .008 
  (-1.84)  (-1.25)  (-1.69)  (0.18)  (0.23) 
Constant  5.216***  6.250***  6.264***  6.544***  6.828*** 
  (8.02)  (11.75)  (19.41)  (18.58)  (14.18) 
R
2  .50  .42  .34  .28  .30 
Observations: 870. t-values in brackets. *** Significant 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * significant at 10%   40 
Table A2b. Quantile regressions – Low educated women 16-65 years old  
Dep. variable: log income from work  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Log months worked  .823***  .905***  .948***  .872***  .780*** 
  (6.38)  (8.20)  (9.82)  (5.96)  (4.08) 
Log hours worked  .502***  .585***  .550***  .606***  .384* 
  (2.68)  (4.39)  (4.49)  (3.30)  (1.82) 
Married/cohabitating  .128*  -.011  -.019  -.044  -.053 
  (1.89)  (-0.22)  (-0.55)  (-0.97)  (-0.94) 
Experience  .014  .013  .010  .012  .022** 
  (1.04)  (1.32)  (1.50)  (1.27)  (2.07) 
Squared experience  -.000  -.000  -.000  -.000  -.000* 
  (-1.25)  (-1.13)  (-1.24)  (-1.02)  (-1.91) 
Experience*Children  -.007  -.002  -.001  -.000  -.004 
  (-1.41)  (-0.71)  (-0.64)  (-0.09)  (-1.27) 
Average supervisory level  .200**  .130**  .102**  .053  .116 
  (2.26)  (2.37)  (2.06)  (0.68)  (1.02) 
High supervisory level  .227  .173  .164  .189  .397*** 
  (1.54)  (1.41)  (1.20)  (1.11)  (2.56) 
Tenure 6-10 years  .000  -.070  -.063  .017  -.010 
  (0.00)  (-1.11)  (-1.02)  (0.24)  (-0.12) 
Tenure 11-15 years  .191*  .012  -.036  -.007  -.074 
  (1.74)  (0.16)  (-0.62)  (-0.11)  (-0.88) 
Tenure more than 15 years  .146  .010  -.007  .036  .060 
  (1.32)  (0.15)  (-0.13)  (0.54)  (0.74) 
Public sector  .031  .064  .049  .-.018  -.061 
  (0.34)  (1.05)  (1.05)  (-0.29)  (-0.77) 
Agriculture  -.285  -.142  -.174  -.014  -.262 
  (-0.52)  (-0.36)  (-0.47)  (-0.06)  (-1.13) 
Services  -.08  .062  .051*  .059  .088* 
  (-0.77)  (0.82)  (0.87)  (0.84)  (1.10) 
Part-time  -.297*  -.282**  -.126  .-.069  -.133 
  (-1.63)  (-2.20)  (-1.24)  (-0.59)  (-0.85) 
Fixed-term or short-term contract  -.048  -.064  -.072*  -.086  -.090 
  (-0.31)  (-0.58)  (-0.93)  (-0.83)  (-0.76) 
Other type of contract*  -.267  -.258*  -.328**  -.106  -.141 
  (-1.49)  (-1.82)  (-2.18)  (-0.74)  (-1.11) 
Firm size: 5-19 employees  .207*  .179**  .164***  .089  .099 
  (1.66)  (1.99)  (2.65)  (1.31)  (1.13) 
Firm size: 20-49 employees  .312**  .152*  .186***  .099  ..036 
  (2.45)  (1.70)  (2.80)  (1.37)  (0.38) 
Firm size 50-99 employees  .262*  .295***  .296***  .161**  .145 
  (1.66)  (2.70)  (4.01)  (2.05)  (1.57) 
Firm size 100-499 employees  .261**  .191*  .263***  .183*  .250** 
  (1.93)  (1.64)  (2.89)  (1.83)  (2.39) 
Firm size: more than 500 employees  .381***  .293***  .284***  .198**  .182* 
  (2.61)  (2.77)  (4.05)  (2.27)  (1.63) 
North-west  .035  .010  .-.018  .007  -.024 
  (0.48)  (0.20)  (-0.33)  (0.10)  (-0.30) 
North-east  .040  -.020  -.029  .028  .125 
  (0.73)  (-0.40)  (-0.63)  (0.40)  (1.55) 
South and Islands  -.129  -.170*  -.049  .040  .052 
  (-1.07)  (-1.67)  (-0.53)  (0.54)  (0.72) 
Constant  5.360***  5.035***  5.246***  5.360***  6.448*** 
  (6.05)  (7.81)  (9.13)  (5.77)  (6.23) 
R
2  .62  .55  .44  .37  .39 
Observations: 318. t-values in brackets. *** Significant 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * significant at 10%   41 
Table A3a. Quantile regressions – Highly educated men 16-65 years old 
Dep. variable: log income from work  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Log months worked  1.363***  1.107***  1.099***  1.123***  1.061*** 
  (4.86)  (11.88)  (18.91)  (13.66)  (7.32) 
Log hours worked  .190*  .208*  .520***  .663***  .464*** 
  (1.75)  (1.71)  (3.98)  (6.69)  (3.21) 
Married/cohabitating  .126***  .074**  .061**  .099***  .111** 
  (2.85)  (2.04)  (1.95)  (2.83)  (2.03) 
University education  .184***  .189***  .216***  .269***  .241*** 
  (4.46)  (4.73)  (5.15)  (5.11)  (3.57) 
Experience  .008  .008*  .009*  .011**  .002 
  (1.19)  (1.30)  (1.72)  (1.90)  (0.22) 
Squared experience  -.000  -.000  -.000  -.000  .000 
  (-0.20)  (-0.61)  (-0.85)  (-0.82)  (0.49) 
Experience*Children  .002  .003***  -.001  .001  .001 
  (1.57)  (2.79)  (0.75)  (0.51)  (0.59) 
Average supervisory level  .095***  .086***  .092***  .100***  .082* 
  (3.56)  (3.74)  (3.37)  (2.94)  (1.88) 
High supervisory level  .126***  .152***  .234***  .247***  .289*** 
  (2.78)  (4.05)  (5.83)  (6.26)  (4.31) 
Tenure 6-10 years  .043  .024*  .047  .084**  .084 
  (0.87)  (0.61)  (1.41)  (2.22)  (1.42) 
Tenure 11-15 years  .000  .019  .039  .047  .059 
  (0.00)  (0.40)  (1.00)  (1.05)  (0.84) 
Tenure more than 15 years  .061  .071  .087**  .069  .159** 
  (1.13)  (1.59)  (2.08)  (1.46)  (2.14) 
Public sector  -.023  -.006  .009  .001  -.017 
  (-0.52)  (-0.18)  (0.31)  (0.03)  (-0.39) 
Agriculture  -.174  -.100  -.165**  -.087  -.022 
  (-1.43)  (-0.93)  (-1.98)  (-0.92)  (-0.13) 
Services  -.031  -.035  .032  .046  .010* 
  (-0.62)  (-0.99)  (1.16)  (1.59)  (0.21) 
Part-time  -.360  -.224  .274  .270  .301 
  (-1.51)  (-0.92)  (0.96)  (0.99)  (1.08) 
Fixed-term or short-term contract  -.290**  -.106  -.056  -.038  -.027 
  (-2.13)  (-1.16)  (-1.20)  (-0.58)  (0.21) 
Other type of contract*  -.668  -.118  -.028  .055  .151 
  (-1.54)  (-0.61)  (-0.27)  (0.36)  (0.57) 
Firm size: 5-19 employees  .132  .088**  .033  .006  .043 
  (1.44)  (1.94)  (0.99)  (0.13)  (0.69) 
Firm size: 20-49 employees  .188*  .111**  .047  .027  -.035 
  (1.88)  (2.22)  (1.19)  (0.65)  (-0.64) 
Firm size 50-99 employees  .215**  .187***  .071*  .037  -.017 
  (2.16)  (3.57)  (1.85)  (0.73)  (0.25) 
Firm size 100-499 employees  .205**  .133***  .097***  .064  .003 
  (2.19)  (2.84)  (2.65)  (1.42)  (0.05) 
Firm size: more than 500 employees  .184**  .164***  .136***  .059  -.025 
  (1.93)  (3.09)  (3.50)  (1.22)  (0.43) 
North-west  .014  -.004  007  -.046  -.001 
  (0.27)  (-0.10)  (0.21)  (-1.07)  (-0.02) 
North-east  .053**  .047  .037  .000  .013 
  (1.30)  (1.54)  (1.18)  (-0.01)  (0.21) 
South and Islands  -.043  -.068**  -.052**  -.074**  -.103** 
  (-1.08)  (-2.38)  (-2.03)  (-2.49)  (-2.46) 
Constant  5.428***  6.223***  5.171***  4.672 ***  5.815*** 
  (7.21)  (12.44)  (10.53)  (11.58)  (8.69) 
R
2  .41  .34  .34  .39  .44 
Observations: 1035. t-values in brackets. *** Significant 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * significant at 10%   42 
Table A3b. Quantile regressions – Lowly educated men 16-65 years old 
Dep. variable: log income from work  Q10  Q25  Q50  Q75  Q90 
Log months worked  1.095***  1.164***  1.034***  1.055***  .830*** 
  (8.00)  (11.77)  (12.36)  (10.08)  (2.85) 
Log hours worked  .232*  .211*  .191*  .318***  .483*** 
  (1.74)  (1.84)  (1.71)  (3.36)  (3.89) 
Married/cohabitating  .074  .101**  .043  .052**  .027 
  (0.92)  (2.46)  (1.43)  (2.07)  (0.51) 
Experience  .018**  .011**  .008**  .006  .013* 
  (2.01)  (2.10)  (2.03)  (1.52)  (1.67) 
Squared experience  -.000  -.000*  -.000*  -.000  -.000 
  (-1.51)  (-1.81)  (-1.61)  (-1.05)  (-1.32) 
Experience*Children  -.000  .000  .001  .003**  .003 
  (-0.00)  (0.35)  (1.00)  (2.07)  (1.59) 
Average supervisory level  .200***  .104***  .118***  .070**  .008 
  (3.28)  (2.82)  (3.34)  (2.37)  (0.15) 
High supervisory level  .019  .062  .108*  .114**  .078 
  (0.07)  (0.92)  (1.70)  (2.29)  (1.32) 
Tenure 6-10 years  .190**  .097***  .069***  -.007  -.059 
  (2.46)  (3.19)  (2.51)  (-0.23)  (-1.31) 
Tenure 11-15 years  .063  .090*  .107***  .020  .004 
  (0.65)  (1.85)  (3.18)  (0.60)  (0.07) 
Tenure more than 15 years  .110  .105***  .111***  .081**  .044 
  (1.32)  (2.95)  (3.13)  (2.42)  (0.83) 
Public sector  .055  .024  -.016  -.024  -.053 
  (0.98)  (0.61)  (-0.48)  (-0.61)  (-0.95) 
Agriculture  .152  -.054  -.031  -.062*  .058 
  (0.87)  (-0.77)  (-0.60)  (-0.77)  (0.33) 
Services  -.001  -.036  .008  .024  .023 
  (-0.02)  (-0.92)  (0.24)  (0.68)  (0.44) 
Part-time  -.419  -.313  -.036*  -.232  .236 
  (-1.50)  (-1.41)  (-1.88)  (-0.95)  (0.78) 
Fixed-term or short-term contract  -.202*  -.145  -.037  -.024  .168 
  (-1.71)  (-1.29)  (-0.58)  (-0.25)  (1.19) 
Other type of contract*  -.483**  -.186***  -.164***  -.173***  -.180 
  (-2.16)  (-2.02)  (-3.14)  (-2.82)  (-0.82) 
Firm size: 5-19 employees  .058  .100***  .073**  .037  .019 
  (1.19)  (2.85)  (2.34)  (1.42)  (0.41) 
Firm size: 20-49 employees  .022  .065  .051*  ..048  .058 
  (0.32)  (1.52)  (1.79)  (1.26)  (1.22) 
Firm size 50-99 employees  .101  .140***  .110***  .088*  .146 
  (1.26)  (3.42)  (3.13)  (1.74)  (1.60) 
Firm size 100-499 employees  .070  .089*  .158***  .123***  .143** 
  (0.97)  (1.84)  (3.84)  (3.23)  (2.51) 
Firm size: more than 500 employees  .109  .162***  .161***  .145***  .118* 
  (1.51)  (3.23)  (3.90)  (3.36)  (1.75) 
North-west  .109*  .042  -.010  .013  -.055 
  (1.89)  (1.00)  (-0.23)  (0.27)  (0.49) 
North-east  .115*  .068  .087**  .048  .044 
  (1.82)  (1.58)  (2.20)  (1.28)  (0.67) 
South and Islands  -.012  -.028  -.011  -.002  -.028* 
  (-0.20)  (-0.90)  (-0.47)  (-0.09)  (-0.81) 
Constant  5.762***  5.938***  6.523***  6.200***  6.274*** 
  (8.84)  (11.47)  (14.95)  (15.11)  (6.67) 
R
2  .47  .39  .32  .27  .21 
Observations: 729. t-values in brackets. *** Significant 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * significant at 10% 
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